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Abstract: We experimentally test for the e￿ect of an additional alternative on the measured
risk preferences of farmers in rural Peru. In our experiment, subjects revealed their risk
preferences with a series of choices between two gambles. We added a third gamble, which
was always dominated by one of the two existing gambles. We found that subjects chose
this gamble nearly one quarter of the time, in some cases causing them to appear more risk
loving. We conclude that the number of available alternatives should be taken into account
for predicting decisions under uncertainty.
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This paper provides a new twist on decision-making under risk among farmers in a developing
country. We run an economics experiment to obtain a behaviorally-based measure of risk
preferences of farmers in cotton producing areas of Peru before and after the addition of a
new alternative. The main contribution of our paper is the investigation of the e￿ect of the
additional alternative.
Choosing among an existing set of options forms the basis of conventional analyses of
decision-making under risk. However, few studies consider the e￿ect of adding new alterna-
tives to a set of options, despite their potentially important e￿ects on real world decisions.
From new medicines or new varieties of consumption goods to new political parties or new
residential neighborhoods, individuals frequently encounter new alternatives in their daily
lives.1
One way in which the mere existence of new alternatives might alter decision-making is
by a￿ecting peoples’ attitudes toward risk. If this turned out to be the case, some important
high-stakes decisions could be a￿ected. Imagine that the availability of a new form of birth
control induces a change in sexual behavior. This could have implications for fertility and
the spread of contagious diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Similarly, what if the availability of a
new high yield variety of seed causes subsistence farmers to become more risk averse? The
farmers could become reluctant to deviate from traditionally safe but low yield varieties,
and this could slow technology adoption in rural areas (Feder, 1980; Feder et al., 1985 and
Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002).
Indeed, the risk attitudes of farmers are a particularly important and widely studied
component of decision-making in developing countries. Since Binswanger (1980, 1981) ￿rst
used experimental methods to measure risk preferences of farmers in India, researchers have
1 The article \Choice is Good. Yes, No or Maybe" in the New York Times’ \Ideas & Trends" section
of March 27, 2005 by Eduardo Porter o￿ers several examples of the possibly negative e￿ect of choice on
decision-making.repeated the exercise in many countries (e.g., Barr, 2003 and Miyata, 2003). We build on
these methods to study the e￿ect of an additional alternative on measured risk preferences.
At the heart of our experiment is a well-known instrument used to measure risk prefer-
ences. The instrument consists of a series of incentivized binary decisions between a relatively
safe and a relatively risky gamble. A subject’s choices reveal her attitude toward risk in this
individual decision-making problem. We add a third gamble, dominated in payo￿ by one
of the existing two gamble, and measure risk preferences again, this time with the new
alternative.
We show that adding an alternative to a set of options can cause people to make more
risky decisions, despite the fact that the new alternative is dominated by an existing option.
While it is true that new alternatives are rarely dominated in the real world, our design is not
meant to mimic precisely a decision in the ￿eld. Rather, our design provides a particularly
clean test of the notion that an additional alternative fundamentally alters preferences: the
third alternative should be irrelevant and simply should not have an e￿ect on subjects’
measured risk preferences. Since the third alternative is not irrelevant to our subjects, we
show that the frame within which the decision is made can a￿ect the risk that people are
willing to take. We suggest that this kind of behavior should be taken into account when
considering programs for developing countries such as technical assistance programs. 2
One feature of our results is surprising: the Peruvian subjects select the dominated third
option nearly 25% of the time when it is available. When the dominated option is similar
to the risky gamble, subjects switch out of the safe gamble and into the dominated risky
gamble. When the dominated option is similar to the safe gamble, subjects switch out of the
risky gamble and into the dominated safe gamble. In other words, the third option causes
subjects to appear to be more risk loving.
2 As another example, Bertrand et al. (2005) varied four dimensions of loan terms (amount, term, monthly
repayment, interest rate) in a study of loan o￿ers. They found that the amount of information presented
a￿ected the types of loans chosen by borrowers.
2We also ran our experiment in a traditional laboratory setting with university under-
graduates in Montreal, and ￿nd that these subjects do not choose the dominated gamble.
Even so, their measured risk preferences change in response to being presented with a new
gamble: the dominated gamble increases the number of times the subjects choose the sim-
ilar gamble. This result is consistent with past related experimental results, and thereby
provides a degree of validation for our experimental design, and provides us with a window
into the di￿erences between the two very di￿erent subject pools.
2 Risk Measurement and Dominated Alternatives
2.1 Measuring Risk
In incentivized experiments, risk attitudes are typically measured by presenting subjects
with choices between gambles of di￿ering risk. Di￿ering risk levels are achieved by varying
either the expected value or the variance of the payo￿s in the gambles faced by subjects.
The subjects’ resulting choices reveal their attitudes towards risk. To ensure that they treat
their decisions seriously, subjects play one of their selected gambles and are paid according
to the outcome.
Holt and Laury (2002) designed an instrument that is commonly used in experiments in
which subjects are asked to make ten decisions. Each decision consists of a binary decision
between a relatively safe gamble (gamble A) and a relatively risky gamble (gamble B). Each
gamble has two possible outcomes: a high payo￿ and a low payo￿. The payo￿s in each
gamble are ￿xed across decisions; gamble B pays more than gamble A if the high payo￿
occurs and less if the low payo￿ occurs. Thus, with a small probability of a high payo￿
occurring, most individuals would prefer gamble A because the low payo￿ is higher than
in gamble B. As the probability of the high payo￿ increases, a subject should switch from
choosing gamble A to choosing gamble B. This switch point provides an interval estimate of
3the subject’s risk preference.
Eckel and Grossman (2003) provide a di￿erent instrument in which subjects make only
one choice from a larger set of gambles. Our instrument, derived from Eckel and Grossman
and similar to the one Binswanger (1980) used in his pioneering study, is illustrated in Figure
1. Rather than altering the probabilities of the gamble payo￿s as in Holt and Laury (2002),
this instrument varies the gamble payo￿s. An advantage of this method is the ease of its
description: all gambles involve an equal probability of the high or low payo￿ and can thus
be represented by a coin toss. We will use this variant of the Eckel-Grossman instrument,
and our design will enable us to directly compare it to the Holt-Laury approach. 3
2.2 Additional Alternatives and Choice
How should additional alternatives a￿ect decision-making? Regularity, a weak assumption
in most choice models (e.g., Luce, 1959 and Tversky, 1972), implies that the probability of
choosing an existing alternative cannot increase when more alternatives are added to the
choice set (Becker, Degroot, and Marschak (1963) found experimental evidence for regular-
ity). A standard prediction regarding the magnitude of the e￿ect of an additional alternative
is that it lowers the probability of choosing existing options in proportion to their shares
(Luce, 1959). However, a new alternative could take disproportionately from (or cannibal-
ize) options that are most similar to it; this is called the similarity e￿ect.The elimination by
aspects model in Tversky (1972) makes such a prediction. 4
Strictly dominated choices are handled in di￿erent ways by di￿erent theories. Luce (1959)
restricted the choice set to non-dominated alternatives. Tversky (1972) handled dominated
3 More speci￿cally, our design enables the comparison between a series of binary decisions and a single
decision from among all options. The systematic altering of expected values of the gambles vs. the altering
of the variance of the gambles is a second di￿erence between the two instruments that could contribute to
further di￿erences in behavior.
4 Buschena and Zilberman (1999) present a test of similarity in choices between a pair of lotteries. Their
measure of similarity is a Euclidean distance. They ￿nd that the more similar two gambles are, the more
likely the risky one is chosen.
4alternatives by assigning them zero probability because they have no unique aspects (i.e.,
since such an alternative is dominated in all dimensions important for discriminating between
alternatives, it cannot satisfy the decision maker in some way that is uniquely di￿erent from
the other alternatives). Psychological theories of non-expected utility typically have an edit-
ing phase, in which the decision maker eliminates dominated alternatives from consideration
before evaluating the remaining alternatives (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 5 Asymmet-
rically dominated alternatives, worse on only some dimensions compared with an existing
alternative, have a di￿erent e￿ect. Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982) show that they can
increase the probability that the similar alternative is chosen.
3 Experimental Design
The instrument in Figure 1, which we denote ‘￿ve options’ (FO hereafter) is inspired by
Eckel and Grossman (2003) and is the foundation of our experimental design. Five options
are presented and each option shows two payo￿s used in the Peruvian experiments, each
with a 50% probability of occurring: in the top option for instance, subjects earn 26 Nuevos
Soles (S/.) with certainty, while the option to the left has a low payo￿ of 20 S/. (with
50% probability) and a high payo￿ of 35 S/. (with 50% probability). 6 As we move counter
clockwise in this ￿gure, the variance in the payo￿s is increasing. A simple way to study the
e￿ect of an additional alternative is to decompose this decision of a single choice between ￿ve
options into four binary decisions. This decomposition, which we denote ‘binary options’ (BO
hereafter) is presented in Figure 2: each row presents a di￿erent binary decision consisting
of two gambles, which are next to each other in the instrument presented in Figure 1. The
decomposition generates a series of decisions as is done in the Holt-Laury instrument, and
5 Starmer (1999) tests and ￿nds evidence that the editing phase in Prospect Theory can cause a certain
type of transitivity to fail.
6 We used di￿erent payo￿s in the Montreal experiments. Counterclockwise from the top, the payo￿s in
Montreal are: 13$/13$, 10$/17.50$, 7$/22$, 4$/26.5$ and 1$/31$, all in Canadian Dollars.
5presents the opportunity to address the methodological question of behavioral di￿erences
between the approach in FO and the approach in BO.
Figure 3 presents two examples of the third alternative added to the FO instrument.
The top row shows one of the binary decisions. The second row shows a triplet with the
center gamble dominated by the gamble to the left. We denote this triplet ‘dominated safe’,
since the third alternative is dominated by the safe gamble. The last row shows the third
alternative dominated by the risky gamble, which we denote ‘dominated risky’.
Together Figures 1, 2 and 3 provide the features of the entire experimental design. There
are thirteen choices in the experiment: one choice between ￿ve gambles to elicit subjects’ risk
preferences (Figure 1); four binary choices designed to elicit the same information (Figure
2); and eight triplet choices with a third alternative, where four times the alternative is a
dominated safe gamble (second row of Figure 3), and four times it is a dominated risky
gamble (third row of Figure 3).
The goal of our design is to fashion a particularly clean test of the e￿ect of a third
alternative. According to expected utility theory, a dominated alternative should not be
chosen and should thus not a￿ect decision-making. We made the dominance as easy to spot
as possible so that the editing phase in psychological alternatives to expected utility theory
would rule out selection of the dominated alternative; according to these theories, once the
dominance is noticed, the alternative is no longer considered. Our choice problem is largely
context free compared with many studies of asymmetric dominance, providing relatively
strong control for studying the e￿ect of the third alternative. For example, many studies
of dominance use hypothetical goods such as beverages or music, making it possible that
subjects select on a dimension important to them but unobserved to the experimenter. If
we can assume that subjects prefer more income to less when playing our gambles, then our
design provides a cleaner measure of the e￿ect of the new alternative.
With our previous discussion of additional, dominated, and asymmetrically dominated
6options in mind, we can test the following conjectures with our design.
Conjecture 1: The dominated options will have no e￿ect.
We base this conjecture on the fact that decision theories tend to rule out choosing
dominated alternatives. If this conjecture is false, then the dominated alternative matters
and we must turn our attention to the following two conjectures.
Conjecture 2: The dominated alternative will remove choice from the similar alternative in
greater proportion than from the dissimilar alternative.
We base this conjecture on the similarity e￿ect. Subjects may see the dominated alterna-
tive as similar to the original gamble in terms of risk, and nearly identical in terms of payo￿,
but superior in a unique aspect uncontrolled by the experimenters. For example, subjects
may see the dominated alternative as desirable because choosing it it makes them feel less
greedy. This would reduce the probability of choosing the similar gamble disproportionately
more than reducing the probability of choosing the dissimilar alternative.
Conjecture 3: The dominated alternative will attract subjects to the similar alternative.
We base this conjecture on the e￿ect of asymmetric dominance. Subjects may see the
dominated alternative as similar to the original gamble in terms of the high payo￿, but
inferior in terms of the low payo￿.7 If they code the gambles in this manner, they may come
to see the additional alternative as asymmetrically dominated in the worse outcome. Based
on past experimental evidence, we would expect this to increase the probability of choosing
the similar gamble disproportionately more than increasing the probability of choosing the
7 Indeed, some of our subjects mentioned the avoidance of a loss as driving their choice. They cannot
actually lose anything in our experiment, but if they are ￿xated on the low payo￿ in the gambles, they can
interpret the realization of the lower payo￿ as a loss if another gamble had a better lower payo￿ than the
one they chose.
7dissimilar alternative (e.g., Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982).
4 Experimental Procedures
4.1 Peruvian Field Experiment
4.1.1 Subject Pool
In the spring of 2005, we held our sessions in Ca~ nete, a district 150 km south of the Peruvian
capital, Lima. This district is in the central Costa region and is an arid area predominantly
specializing in cotton production. We held one session in each of three di￿erent communities:
Imperial, Cinco Esquinas, and Rinconada. We visited each of the three communities one
week in advance to recruit subjects and the community leaders arranged for a locale in which
to run the session.
We added a short questionnaire to collect basic individual and household demographic
characteristics of the Peruvian subject pool. The questionnaire was administered by two
experienced surveyors after the session but before subjects were paid. As is customary in
rural Peru, where illiteracy may be a problem, surveyors read the question to the surveyed
individual who responded orally. The oral responses were then recorded on the questionnaire
sheets by the surveyors.
To control for wealth, the survey included questions about the dwelling that are used
by the Peruvian statistical agency (INEI) to construct an Unmet Basic Needs Index. For
example, we asked about the materials used for the construction of the dwelling (e.g. adobe,
concrete...), and access to water, sanitation and electricity. We constructed our Unmet Basic
Needs Index with the standard used by the INEI. The means suggest that about one third
of our subjects has at least one unmet basic need.
The three communities are quite heterogeneous: Imperial being semi-urban and the most
8developed and Rinconada the most isolated (rural) and least developed. Average education
levels in these areas, despite being rural and agricultural, are relatively high. As shown
in the appendix, 26% our subjects completed secondary schooling, while 33% have some
tertiary schooling, signi￿cantly higher than the national average of 22% (Barro and Lee,
2000). Most of our subjects are involved in some form of agriculture, mostly cotton farming
and at the time of the survey, agricultural activity was at a low as the cotton ￿owers had
only just bloomed. Men are over-represented in our subject pool (they account for 72% of
the sample), and mean age is almost 46.
4.1.2 Sessions
Subjects were given a show up fee of 10 S/. (approx. $3 US) upon arrival to cover their
transportation and opportunity cost. 8 Our research assistant, a native Spanish speaker,
gave the instructions in all three sessions. The subjects were given a booklet comprising
of the thirteen decisions. In each decision, they indicated their choice by pen. The order
of the thirteen decisions as well as the left/right presentation of the gambles was randomly
determined.9 Forty three subjects participated in the experiments, with session sizes of 11,
15, and 17.10 Subjects earned an average of 25 S/. in addition to the 10 S/. show up
fee. The experiments lasted approximately thirty minutes, and the entire time spent on the
experiments and the survey was approximately 2 hours per session.
8 A day agricultural labourer in this region is paid 8 to 10 Nuevos Soles.
9 The third alternative was always placed in the center so that it would always be apparent that it was
similar to and dominated by one of the other two alternatives.
10 Sample sizes in experimental studies of risk preferences in developing countries tend to be quite small.
Our study compares in sample size with Grisley and Kellogg (1987) who had 39 farmers and Henrich and
McElreath (2002) who had 51 farmers.
94.2 Montreal Laboratory Experiment
4.2.1 Subject Pool
We held each of our sessions at the Bell Laboratory for Experimental Economics at the
Centre for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organizations (CIRANO) in the spring
of 2005. We recruited from an English speaking subject pool (there is also a French speaking
pool) consisting primarily of university undergraduates in Montreal. We did not ask the same
post-experiment questions as in Peru because of the di￿erence between the subject pools.
Most notably, we asked the subjects to report their postal code (the equivalent to the zip
code in the U.S.) so that we could use the average property value to control for their wealth. 11
Unlike in Peru, subjects ￿lled out their questionnaires individually.
4.2.2 Sessions
To the extent possible, we followed identical experimental procedures as in Peru. We con-
ducted three sessions, subjects were paid a $10 CAD show up fee before making their deci-
sions, the same research assistant conducted the sessions and read the script to the subjects,
the experiments were conducted with pencil and paper, and we used the identical realizations
of random orderings of decisions that we used in Peru. Forty four subjects participated in
the experiments, with session sizes of 12, 15, and 17. Subjects earned an average of $19
CAD in addition to the $10 CAD show up fee. The experiments lasted approximately thirty
minutes, and the entire time spent on the experiments and the survey was approximately 1
hour per session.
11 We matched subjects by Forward Sortation Area (￿rst three characters of the postal code) to the average
value of dwelling in the 20% sample of the 2001 Canadian Census (Statistics Canada). To approximate
parental wealth, we also asked subjects for the postal code where they grew up. Unfortunately, many of our
subjects are international students, for which we have no comparable measure of dwelling value.
105 Results
5.1 Risk Preference Measures
Figure 4 shows the distribution of choices in the FO instrument (depicted in Figure 1) for
the Peruvian sessions. This distribution is skewed towards the safest of the ￿ve options.
Conversely, Figure 5 depicts the distribution of choices made in the Montreal sessions. This
distribution is bi-modal and shows that Montreal subjects generally choose riskier options;
roughly a quarter of all subjects choose the riskiest of the ￿ve. Our results suggest that the
Peruvian farmers tend to be relatively more risk averse than the Montreal subjects. 12
To investigate the possible determinants of risk aversion, we analyze the e￿ect of socio-
economic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, wealth, education) on measured risk
aversion (Table 1). Columns (1) reports the results for the Peruvian sample and column (2)
for the Montreal samples. We convert the FO choice into a discrete number to create the
dependent variable, increasing in risk from 0 (the safest choice) to 4 (the riskiest choice).
Thus, the dependent variable is increasing in risk loving attitudes. The experimental litera-
ture, with particular reference to farmers in developing countries, does not however provide
￿rm predictions.
Age has no e￿ect on risk preferences among the Peruvian farmers and a negative e￿ect
among the Montreal subjects. Thus, our Montreal (but not Peru) results are consistent with
Miyata (2003) who ￿nds that older Indonesian farmers are more risk averse. Single individ-
uals are more risk loving than married individuals, relative to being divorced or widowed.
Men are not discernibly more risk loving than women in Peru, though they are in Montreal,
consistent with Eckel et al. (2004) and Wik et al. (2004). Education has a negative e￿ect
on measured risk preferences in the Peruvian sample; an e￿ect that is increasing with edu-
12 We cannot rule out that this di￿erence is due, at least in part, to di￿erent stakes in the di￿erent
locations. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) in a survey note that the e￿ect of stakes on decisions in experiments
is context dependent, where increasing stakes in gambles increases risk levels of risk aversion. Holt and
Laury (2002) report that higher stakes led to more risk averse behavior.
11cational attainment. This e￿ect is consistent with Grisley and Kellog’s (1987) study of Thai
farmers, but contrary to Miyata’s (2003) results. Education has little e￿ect on risk pos-
tures in Montreal, which might be explained by little variation in educational attainment.
Wealth matters in both samples, but with opposing directions. The household’s poverty
status, measured by the Unmet Basic Needs Index, is inversely related to risk preferences in
Peru indicating that wealthier individuals are less risk averse. Average value of dwellings in
forward sortation area of current residence, the measure of wealth for the Montreal sample,
suggests instead that wealthier subjects are more risk averse. Our inconclusive wealth e￿ects
are however consistent with existing empirical evidence: Binswanger (1980), Miyata (2003)
and Kebede et al. (2004) ￿nd that risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, while Shahabuddhin
et al. (1986) and Grisley and Kellog (1987) ￿nd the reverse. 13
5.2 Comparison of the FO instrument with the BO Instrument
We are interested in whether the two methods yield similar results in terms of measured
risk posture. In BO, we count the number of risky choices to approximate the degree of
risk loving, and the number of safe choices to approximate the degree of risk aversion (this
measure was used by Holt and Laury). As there are four binary decisions, an individual who
makes 4 risky choices is considered more risk loving than an individual making only 3, 2, 1 or
no risky choices. Similarly, we can also approximate risk preferences from either of the two
sets of triplet decisions in a parallel fashion. 14 Since the payo￿s in our BO instrument come
directly from our FO instrument, individuals who chose a risky option in one should also
tend to choose a risky option in the other. Thus one would expect to see a high correlation
13 We present the results from a Poisson regression. One may argue that such a dependent variable may
be better estimated with an ordered probit or an ordered logit. The ordered probit and logit produce similar
results to the Poisson with the following exceptions: marital status and unmet basic needs index is no longer
signi￿cant in Peru, while father’s education becomes weakly signi￿cant in the Montreal sample suggesting
that family background is correlated with risk-aversion. Results are available upon request.
14 Note that the number of choices acts as an ordered variable and that associated with each binary
decision, for instance, is a parameter range for the coe￿cient of relative risk aversion.
12between the choice in FO and the number of risky choices in BO and the triplet decisions.
Table 2 provides the correlation matrix of subjects’ choices in the FO, the BO and the two
sets of triplet decisions. We immediately observe that the correlation between the number of
risky BO choices and the choice in the FO instrument is statistically signi￿cant and positive,
but less than one. The correlation coe￿cient from the Peruvian sample is half that from
the Montreal sample. The correlations between the risky BO choices and the risky triplet
choices are stronger than those between BO and FO for both samples. Also, the correlation
is higher for the triplet with the dominated risky than the triplet with dominated safe. We
conclude that while both instruments measure similar risk preferences, these measures are
nonetheless di￿erent.
5.3 E￿ect of the Additional Alternative
5.3.1 Are Dominated Options Irrelevant?
Conjecture 1 has two testable implications. First, the dominated alternative should never
be chosen. Thus, the number of dominated safe choices in the triplets with dominated safe
(nts
ds) should be equal to the number of dominated risky choices in the dominated risky
triplets (ntr
dr). Second, the dominated alternative should have no e￿ect. Thus, the number
of safe BO choices (nb
s) should be the same as the number of safe choices in the triplets
with dominated safe (nts
s ) and the triplets with dominated risky options ( ntr
s ). Similarly, the
number of risky BO choices (nb
r) should be the same as the number of risky choices in the
triplet with dominated safe (nts
r ) and the triplets with dominated risky (ntr
r ).
This conjecture is resoundingly rejected. In the Peruvian sample, the ￿rst part of the
conjecture is easily rejected: in the triplets with dominated safe options, 26% selected the
dominated safe gamble while 23% selected the dominated risky gamble in the triplets with
dominated risky options. In an unreported regression, we found that none of the socio-
13economic characteristics predicted whether subjects made a dominated choice. 15 In the
Montreal sample, only 2% of triplet decisions were dominated ones; the ￿rst part of the
conjecture thus holds for this sample.
At this point we check the data for evidence for a naive diversi￿cation strategy in case
subjects are randomly choosing the dominated alternative. When presented with ‘ m’ alter-
natives, a diversi￿cation strategy would have subjects choose each alternative with frequency
‘1=m’. Such strategies have been observed among investors (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001) and
trick-or-treating children (Read and Lownstein, 1995). 16 We do not believe that our sub-
jects are employing a diversi￿cation strategy. If they were, they would be choosing the safe,
dominated and risky options with equal frequency (1 =3 of the time). In Peru, only 3 subjects
are observed with such choices. In Montreal, meanwhile, such choices are never observed.
The second part of conjecture 1 is however rejected in both samples. Table 2 showed that
the number of risky BO choices is positively correlated with the number of risky choices in
both triplets. However, this correlation is signi￿cantly less than one, more so for the Peruvian
sample than for the Montreal sample. Moreover, Table 3 provides some regression results
where we present the correlation between a risky BO choice and a risky choice in each of the
two associated triplets, controlling for socio-economic characteristics. If conjecture 1 were
true, then the coe￿cient of the number of risky BO choices on the number of risky triplet
choices should be close to or equal to one. This is clearly not so in either the Peruvian
or the Montreal samples: the further away the coe￿cients are from one, the more the
dominated option mattered. Since the Peruvian sample estimates are signi￿cantly lower
15 Given such a high rate of dominated option selection in Peru, our surveyors were asked to investigate
this further by asking subjects why they chose the strategies they chose. That some subjects chose the
dominated option is not random. One admitted to choosing based on their lucky numbers, which happened
frequently in the dominated payo￿s. Many others however were attracted to the dominated gamble because
it made them feel less greedy. A common response was along the lines that ‘God rewards modesty but
punishes greediness’.
16 Read and Lowenstein (1995) noted that this behavior occurred more often when subjects made their
choices simulataneously than when they chose sequentially. Our BO design involved sequential choices to
mitigate this possible e￿ect.
14than in the Montreal sample, we conclude that the dominated alternative matters most
among our Peruvian subjects.
Additionally, we test the equality of the distributions between the BO and each of the
triplet decisions (Table 4) using mean comparison tests. In nearly all cases, especially in the
Peruvian sample, we reject that the number of safe (risky) BO choices equals the number of
safe (risky) triplet choices, rejecting conjecture 1 in this sample. Conjecture 1 is only weakly
rejected in the Montreal sample in half of the cases: we reject equality of means between BO
and triplet decisions at the 10% level, and only once at the 5% level. Since subjects chose
dominated options in the Peru sessions but not in Montreal, then conjecture 2 is relevant in
Peru while conjecture 3 is relevant in Montreal.
5.3.2 Does the Additional Alternative Make the Similar One More Attractive?
Conjecture 2 implies that the dominated alternative removes disproportionately from the
similar option compared to the dissimilar one. Thus, the number of safe BO choices minus
half of the number of dominated safe choices must be greater than the number of safe choices





s ) and the number of risky BO choices
less the number of dominated risky choices must be greater than the number of risky choices





r ). In this conjecture, subjects
might make some dominated choices. Thus nts
ds 6= 0 and ntr
dr 6= 0.
Rows (5) and (6) of Table 4 test this conjecture. Our results here are surprising. In the
case of triplets with dominated safe options, the dominated option appears to have taken
away proportionately from the safe and risky choices. However, in the case of the triplets
with dominated risky options, there seems to be a shift towards the risky option, while the
conjecture would imply the opposite. These results are supported by Table 3: comparing
the coe￿cients in Panels A and B for the Peruvian sample, we see that the estimates are
signi￿cantly larger in Panel A than in Panel B. Thus, a risky choice in the triplet with
15dominated risky is more highly correlated with a risky choice in the BO compared with
the risky choice in the triplet with dominated safe. In these triplets, subjects appeared to
become more risk-loving when faced with the third, dominated risky, alternative.
5.3.3 Does Asymmetric Dominance Hold?
Conjecture 3 implies that the dominated alternative attracts subjects to the similar alter-
native. Thus, the number of safe BO choices must be less than the number of safe choices
in the triplets with dominated safe option (nb
s < nts
s ) and the number of risky BO choices
must be less than the number of risky choices in the triplets with dominated risky option
(nb
r < ntr
r ). In this conjecture, subjects should not make dominated choices.
Rows (7) and (10) of Table 4 tests this conjecture for the Montreal sample. Our results
suggest that nb
s = nts
s and weakly that nb
r < ntr





r , our results reject the former but is weakly consistent with the latter at a
10% con￿dence level. We conclude that the dominated option did not a￿ect the Montreal
sample. To the extent that the dominated option did matter, our results weakly support
the asymmetric dominance e￿ect. In such a conventional subject pool, these results are not
surprising and tend to validate our experimental design: the asymmetric dominance e￿ect
has been found in marketing studies.
6 Discussion
This study is the ￿rst to document the e￿ect of an additional alternative on measured risk
preferences. In a ￿eld experiment, we modeled the decision-making process as a choice
between a safe and a risky gamble. We also presented subjects with a third gamble that is
dominated in payo￿s by one of the other two. This is a simple test of how subjects react
to being faced with a new alternative: we should not observe subjects choosing the new
16alternative if it is dominated by one of the original ones.
We ran our ￿eld experiments in Peruvian cotton producing communities. Our results
strongly indicated that the third, additional, alternative did indeed matter in subjects’
decision-making. We found two surprising and puzzling results. First, we observed that
subjects chose the dominated gamble a quarter of the times in which these were presented to
them. Second, when the dominated alternative was similar to the risky gamble, we found that
the dominated alternative removed choice from the similar alternative in lesser proportion
than from the dissimilar alternative. Thus, subjects appeared to become more risk-loving.
We are lacking in a theory that explains this type of behavior: this e￿ect is contrary to
Tversky’s ‘similarity’ e￿ect. To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst time that these two e￿ects
have been documented.
We ran these experiments with a more conventional subject pool (university students) in
Montreal. We conclude that the Peruvian subjects react quite di￿erently from the Montreal
subjects when faced with an additional alternative: their measured risk preferences change
more when presented with a third dominated alternative. Meanwhile, the e￿ect in the
Montreal sample appeared like asymmetric dominance.
The results of our experiments suggest that the availability of new alternatives, be it new
farming technologies, new contraceptive methods or new credit contracts, may in￿uence risk
taking behavior. Policy makers and non-governmental organizations may want to take this
into consideration when devising technical assistance, training or educational programs.
Finally, we contributed methodologically by being the ￿rst to compare behavior with
an instrument with a single choice between many alternatives (FO) with one that poses a
series of binary choices (BO). This methodological contribution is useful because both types
of instruments are currently in use (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002 and Eckel and Grossman,
2003). While the subjects’ elicited risk preferences are correlated across both instruments,
the correlation is far from being one. This is particularly the case in the Peruvian sample.
17Thus, our results suggest that researchers exercise caution in the interpretation of their
risk preference elicitation mechanisms, particularly when doing ￿eld work in a developing
country.
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Figure 1: ‘Five Options’ Risk Preference Measurement Instrument 
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8 S/. 53 S/. 14 S/. 44 S/.
20 S/. 35 S/.
26 S/. 26 S/.
 
 
Note: In this instrument, subjects are presented with a single decision between these five options.  
Each option is associated with a high payoff and a low payoff, with 50% probability that either 
will occur. The payoffs depicted here are the ones from the Peruvian experiments, and so are 
denominated in Peruvian Nuevos Soles (S/.). In the Montreal experiments, we used different 
payoffs. Counterclockwise from the top, the payoffs in 
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Note: This figure shows how the one decision presented in Figure 1 can be decomposed into four 
different decisions. The payoffs are also depicted in Peruvian Nuevos Soles (S/.).  See the note to 








26 S/.  35 S/. 26 S/.  20 S/. 
20 S/.  44 S/. 35 S/.  14 S/. 
14 S/.  53 S/. 44 S/.  8 S/. 
8 S/.  62 S/. 53 S/.  2 S/.   23




8 S/. 62 S/. 53 S/. 2 S/. 8 S/. 62 S/. 53 S/. 2 S/.
8 S/. 62 S/. 53 S/. 2 S/. 7 S/. 50 S/. 8 S/. 62 S/. 53 S/. 2 S/. 7 S/. 50 S/.
8 S/. 62 S/. 53 S/. 2 S/. 1 S/. 58 S/. 8 S/. 62 S/. 53 S/. 2 S/. 1 S/. 58 S/.
 
 
Note: For each binary decision in Figure 2 (for example the top row in this table), we added two 
other decisions, one with a dominated safe alternative (second row) and one with a dominated 
risky alternative (third row).  Payoffs depicted in this figure are from the Peruvian experiments 
and denominated in Peruvian Nuevos Soles (S/.) 
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Figure 4 















































Montreal A N=17 Montreal B N=15 Montreal C N=12 Total N=44
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Table 1 – Socio-Economic Determinants of Risk Preferences Measured by the 
‘Five Options’ Instrument (Poisson Estimates) 

































Unmet basic needs index -2.787* --
(1.457) --
Average value of dwelling in Forward Sortation      -- -2.397**
 Area of current residence (log, Cdn $)
d/ -- (0.964)
Mother's educational level 
e/ -- 0.186
-- (0.144)
Father's educational level 
e/ -- -0.218
-- (0.138)
Wald Chi-Squared (11) 48.33*** 49.50***
Pseudo R Squared 0.1664 0.1436
***, ** and * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Results 
robust to specification (ologit, oprobit and tobit yield similar results).  All regressions 
include session controls. 
a/ Omitted category is separated, divorced or widowed. 
b/ 
Omitted category is less than primary completed. 
c/ Omitted category is completed 
primary. 
d/Source: 20% sample of the 2001 Canadian Census (Forward Sortation Area 
corresponds to the first 3 characters of the posal code). 
e/ Categorical variable:  0=less 
than secondary school; 1=secondary school completed; 2=University undergraduate; 
3=University graduate.  
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Table 2 – Correlation Matrix of Risky choices in the ‘Five Options’, ‘Binary 
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Table 3 – Marginal Effects from Logit Estimation 
Panel A - Risky Choice in triplet with dominated risky
Risky choice in binary 0.288*** 0.278*** 0.640*** 0.603***
(0.080) (0.088) (0.064) (0.069)
Wald Chi-Squared  13.53*** 41.41*** 47.66*** 50.55***
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0730 0.1312 0.3368 0.3629
Individual and Household Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 172 172 176 176
Panel B - Risky Choice in triplet with dominated safe
Risky choice in binary 0.206*** 0.156*** 0.618*** 0.598***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.069) (0.078)
Wald Chi-Squared  10.21** 30.15*** 47.41*** 54.22***
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0722 0.1421 0.3023 0.3205
Individual and Household Covariates No Yes No Yes
N 172 172 176 176
Difference 0.082*** 0.122*** 0.022 0.005
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016)
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.1247] [0.7509]
Montreal (N=176)
Peru (N=172) Montreal (N=176)
Peru (N=172)
***, ** and * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  All 
regressions are clustered by subject and include session controls. Same covariates as 
in Table 1.    28
Table 4 – Non-Parametric Tests  
(P-Values in brackets; Ho: Mean(Diff)=0) 








(1)    [0.9984] [0.0032] [0.0016] 
(2)    [1.0000] [0.0001] [0.0000] 
(3)    [0.9986] [0.0028] [0.0014] 
(4) [0.9086]  [0.1828]  [0.0914] 
(5) [0.6243]  [0.7513]  [0.3757] 
(6) 
 
[0.0370] [0.0739] [0.9630] 








(7)    [0.1336] [0.2671] [0.8664] 
(8)    [0.9334] [0.1332] [0.0666] 
(9)    [0.9531] [0.0937] [0.0469] 
(10)    [0.0914] [0.1827] [0.9086] 
Notes: 
b
s n =Number of safe choices in the binary decisions; 
ts
s n = number of safe 
choices in the triplets with dominated safe; 
tr
s n =number of safe choices in the 
triplets with dominated risky; 
b
r n =number of risky choices in the binary decis-
ions; 
ts
r n =number of risky choices in the triplets with dominated safe; and 
tr
r n = 

















































Appendix – Descriptive Statistics of Subject Pools 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Demographics
Age 45.953 13.603 20 74 25.045      6.833        19 53
Household Head 0.279 0.454 1 0
Sex (Male=1) 0.721 0.454 0 1 0.545 0.504 01
Married 0.767 0.427 0 1 0.136 0.347 01
Separated 0.070 0.258 0 1 0.000
Single 0.163 0.374 0 1 0.864 0.347 01
Working 0.837 0.373 0 1 0.364 0.487 01
Education
Student 0.818 0.390 01
Less than Primary schooling 0.232 0.427 0 1
Some Primary schooling 0.186 0.394 0 1
Completed secondary schooling 0.256 0.441 0 1
Post secondary schooling 0.326 0.474 0 1
Post secondary schooling incomplete  0.023        0.151        0 1
Post secondary schooling complete  0.727        0.451        0 1
Graduate school 0.250        0.438        0 1
Wealth
Unmet basic needs index 0.318 0.216 0 0.83333
Average dwelling value in FSA (in $CDN)
a/
217,771    72,591      110,553  346,586  
Peru (N=43) Montreal (N=44)
a/Source: 20% sample of the 2001 Canadian Census (Forward Sortation Area corresponds to the first 3 characters of the posal code).  